specialist anaesthetists, most of whom have therefore not seen an AIDS sufferer. It has been estimated that for each known AIDS case there are 25 to 100 unsuspecting carriers of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), the causative organism. In 1986, when the Centres for Disease Control estimated that there were 26,000 cases of AIDS in U.S.A. there were an estimated 1 to 1.5 million carriers ofHIV;1,2 a ratio of 58 carriers to each patient with clinical AIDS. A similar ratio applied to Australia gives about 63,800 carriers in a population of 16 million: one in 250. A 1987 estimate from England and Wales 3 was of 20,000 to 50,000 HIV carriers when there were eight hundred reported cases of AIDS there, a ratio of between 25 and 62 carriers for every known AIDS case. A midrange estimate would give Australia 48,000 HIV carriers, correponding to one in every 330 people. There is little point in trying to be more precise than that; whatever the actual figures as I write this, they will be significantly worse by the time you read it. If the distribution of HIV carriers in the general population is uniform an anaesthetist giving a thousand anaesthetics a year would expect three of his patients to be HIV positive; statistically, only 5% of such anaesthetists would not have been exposed to an HIV positive patient last year. I suspect that I am one of the majority. Neither AIDS sufferers nor HIV positive patients will be uniformly distributed; they are concentrated in cities, as are specialist anaesthetists and major hospitals, together with their complement of trainee anaesthetists, nursing and paramedical staff.
Anaesthetic nurses and technicians are regularly exposed to blood and saliva. Surgeons, assistants and theatre nurses are exposed to blood and, during some orthopaedic procedures, to an aerosol of blood and bone fragments. Their comprehension of the risk comes largely from material intended for the lay public, material written to allay fear and prejudice, material designed to convey the message that, in the absence of intravenous drug abuse or 'unprotected' sex, the risk of infection is negligible. In the average operating suite, needlestick injuries are common, as is the contamination of the skin of staff by body fluids of the patient. Although any single incident may not pose an unacceptable threat, the cumulative risk of many incidents may be unacceptably high. This is a consideration which is peculiar to a few isolated areas such as operating suites. Within that environment we can expect infection control guidelines to be adhered to only if staff see the HIV virus as a real threat to life. Contrary to common belief, education does not necessarily allay fears about AIDS. Students with at least a secondary school education in basic biology can appreciate the salient features of HIV infection and of the current pandemic. An appreciation of those facts, as detailed below, is usually quite adequate to bring about a remarkable adherence to infection control guidelines. Consider the following brief summary. It is followed by a more detailed consideration of the salient points.
AIDS is caused by HIV-l (Human Immunodefiency Virus-I) which has recently crossed the species gap from African monkeys. Unless some other cause of death intervenes, most, if not all of those infected will develop AIDS after a mean incubation period of about eight years, and die about a year after the onset of AIDS. 4 Very early in the epidemic, optimists predicted that many patients would recover. It is now widely accepted that infection with HIV leads to inexorable damage to the immune system, and subsequently to fatal opportunistic infection or tumour in essentially every patient. 5 There is no cure, although some drugs may prolong the course of the disease. There is no vaccine, and little likelihood of one being developed. The lentiviruses, to which HIV belongs, are a group of viruses which include equine infectious anaemia virus of horses, the caprine arthritis and encephalitis virus of goats, and the Meadi-Visna virus of sheep. The latter is 100% fatal. All attempts to produce lentivirus vaccines in animals have failed. 6 The doubling time for the AIDS pandemic is roughly one year. The total number of AIDS cases reported worldwide increased from 63,998 as of November 4, 1987 to 124,114 on October 30, 1988 , an increase of 94%.7 The world-wide figures are very subject to the vagaries of reporting, so the figures for Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States may be more representative of the English-speaking world. These countries showed increases of 65%, 68% and 76% respectively. There are difficulties in making inferences about the rate of spread of HIV infection, from reported data on the associated illness, AIDS. 8 An analysis of seropositive blood donors 9 suggests an initial doubling time of one year for HIV infection as is seen with fully developed AIDS. If, as is likely, the two increase at the same rate, then on average each HIV-infected individual directly infects about seven others. This number, the basic reproductive rate for the infection, must be reduced to less than one if the epidemic is to die out. 10 In countries like Australia, Canada, USA and most of Europe, infection is predominantly seen in homosexual and bisexual males, intravenous drug users, recipients of blood and blood products, and their sexual partners. In much of the rest of the world, particularly in African nations, the pattern is more typical of spread via heterosexual intercourse. Heterosexual spread currently accounts for only 1 % of reported Australian AIDS cases, but the proportion tends to be higher elsewhere. Of 1982 cases of AIDS reported in the United Kingdom, transmission in 88 (4%) was reported as heterosexual. 11 Because a 'safe' blood supply depends principally on the voluntary screening out of donors involved in known 'risk' behaviour such as intravenous drug use and male to male sex, spread of the virus to the heterosexual community would leave the blood supply at significant risk; those infected through heterosexual activity often do not perceive themselves to be in a 'risk' category, and tend to continue to donate blood. Spread of the HIV virus in the health care setting has apparently been minimal but as with other AIDS risks, recent estimates are less encouraging than earlier ones. The risk of persistent infection following needlestick injury involving HIV contaminated blood is estimated now at 4 in 1000, and there is reason to suspect that this estimate will be revised upwards.
Humans are changing their behaviour to combat the HIV epidemic, but the virus is changing too. In viruses like HIV, point mutations during replication occur about a million times more frequently than in deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) replication in higher organisms. 12 Each virus particle carries an average of five to ten new mutations. Two distinct HIV viruses, HIV-l and HIV-2 probably diverged in their evolution about thirty years ago. A third, HIV-3, has now been reported in a married couple on the West Coast of Africa.
Basic biology
Although some debate continues, AIDS is generally held to represent the terminal stage of infection with HIV. Viruses invade cells, and subvert the machinery of the cell to produce more viruses. The core of the virus is nucleic acid which replicates in the host cell, and which codes for viral proteins. In HIV virus, the nucleic acid is ribonucleic acid (RNA). This is not in itself unusual; the influenza and hepatitis A viruses, for instance, are RNA viruses. The HIV virus is a particular type of RNA virus; it is a retrovirus, a type of virus which, until recently, was thought not to infect humans.
As the prefix 'retro' suggests, the virus works 'backwards'. In the cells of higher organisms the genetic blueprint resides in the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the nucleus. The DNA carries the genes and codes for ribonucleic acid (RNA). RNA carries the information into the cell cytoplasm where it directs the synthesis of proteins. This sequence, 'DNA makes RNA which makes protein' is part of the central dogma of modern biology. The retroviruses are the exception. They carry RNA and an unusual enzyme, 'reverse transcriptase' which generates DNA from RNA. This represents a reversal of the usual flow of genetic information. Inserted into the DNA of the cell nucleus, that viral DNA, referred to as provirus, becomes as much a part of the cell as the genes it was 'born' with. It cannot be attacked by antibodies or drugs. It can lie dormant indefinitely. If activated, that DNA can code for one or a hundred thousand virus particles. Released from the host cell, the virus particles infect other cells in which they will in turn become DNA proviruses. The body can mount an immune response against the viruses but cannot identify cells containing a latent provirus. It is this which leads many to suspect that we will never develop a cure.
Jumping the species gap
We are familiar with the havoc caused by viruses from one species infecting another. The new host species is defenseless, and until the virus mutates to a less virulent form, morbidity and mortality can approach 100%. Analogies drawn by Searle 6 include myxomatosis which is harmless in the South American jungle rabbit, but initially more than 99% lethal in the European rabbit, and African swine fever which is harmless in the African wart-hog but fatal in the European pig. More topical now is the Canine Distemper Virus which last year killed many of the seals in the Baltic and North Seas. This virus is one of four in the genus Morbillivirus, to which the measles virus belongs. Introduced into human populations, the measles virus has, historically, caused a high mortality. Like other species, Homo sapiens can die in large numbers when exposed to a novel virus. Some viruses, like the Marburg virus, kill so quickly when transmitted from monkey to man that the infected individual has insufficient time to infect many others. The AIDS virus takes many years to kill, during which time an unsuspecting carrier can pass it on to many others. In the absence of an effective therapy, most (perhaps all) infected individuals will develop AIDS, and will die from it.
Cause oJ death
Although HIV infection produces its clinical effects largely by attacking cells in the immune and nervous systems, it is now known to infect many cell types. In the brain, capillary endothelial cells, oligodendrocytes and astrocytes are infected. Infection of enterochromaffin cells in the intestinal mucosa may account for the diarrhoea. 13 Monocytes and macrophages, the scavengers of the body, are probably the first cells infected. They have a surface protein, CD4, to which the AIDS virus binds prior to entering the cell. These cells are found throughout the body, including mucous membranes and skin, where they are called Langerhan's cells. HIV infected material coming into contact with mucous membrane or skin can be taken up by Langerhan's cells and transmitted to the rest of the body.14 Case studies of laboratory workers contracting HIV following skin exposure suggests that skin abrasions facilitate uptake, but may not be necessary. As Kayl5 points out ... 'The intact skin may well be a good defense against HIV but broken or inflamed skin makes an individual vulnerable. Most adults have numerous small abrasions on their hands or have eczema, particularly if th'eir occupation involves frequent handwashing in detergent. ' A subset of lymphocytes, the T4 lymphocytes, carry the CD4 protein and are susceptible to HIV infection. These cells are involved in cell-mediated immunity, and it is the eventual depletion ofT4lymphocytes that leaves the body susceptible to opportunistic infection and some tumours.
Treatment
There is currently no cure for HIV infection. Azidothymidine (AZT, zidovudine) acts by substituting for thymidine in DNA synthesis, stopping reverse transcription of viral RNA. It is toxic, must be given for life, and serves only to slow the progression of some forms of the disease. Like bacteria, viruses mutate to drug-resistant forms. Our naive hopes that viral drug resistance would not be a clinical problem have recently been dispelled by several reports. 16 There is now evidence for HIV developing resistance to AZT, 17 as one might expect when an organism which mutates so fast is exposed to a drug for so long. Long exposure of the virus to AZT is necessary because there is no known strategy for ridding the body of cells containing the latent DNA provirus. Marrow transplant has been tried but has failed, even in patients having an identical twin.
Cells replicating the virus exhibit viral proteins on their surface. In particular they show the viral protein gp120 (a 120 kD glycoprotein) which binds to the CD4 protein on T4 cells. This has several implications; some good, some bad. It leads to infected T 4 cells binding to uninfected ones, the gp 120 on the infected cell binding to CD4 protein on the uninfected one. The cells join together to form a syncytium; one infected T4 cell can form a syncytium with, and consequently kill, 500 previously uninfected ones without the virus ever leaving its host cell and being exposed to antibodies.
On the other hand the affinity between gp 120 and the CD4 protein can lead to therapeutic possibilities; it can act as the basis for . a 'magic bullet' approach. Genetically engmeered CD4 protein, raised in bacteria or yeast (recombinant CD4) can be joined to the 'business end' of an antibody molecule, or to some toxic molecule, producing a combination that will home in on, and destroy, cells which are replicating the virus. Such cells must exhibit gp 120 on their surface and will be susceptible, although cell~ harbouring the latent provirus will not. Such strategies will prolong the life of infected individuals who know themselves to be infected, and who live in countries where such sophisticated treatments are economically feasible. Because many cells containing the provirus will not express gp 120, those cells will not be killed. Treatment will have to be continued for life to contain the disease. Only a small fraction of people infec~ed with HIV know oftheir infection; the remamder, more than 90%, cannot be treated. In many countries, including some areas of Africa where 30% of those tested carry the virus, treatment is not economically feasible. Worse, it is not even economically feasible, in many developing countries, to screen the donated blood supply to stop the spread of infection by that route.
Although AZT and recombinant CD4 are not the only therapeutic possibilities on the horizon, their shortcomings are shared by the other candidates. Of other likely drugs, three are, like AZT, dideoxy analogues of bases normally present in DNA. They act by inhibiting reverse transcriptase, as do phosphoformate and rifabritin. Dextran sulphate probably inhibits binding of virus to cells, in much the same way as does recombinant CD4. Castanospermine acts by inhibiting enzymes involved in the sugar component of glycoproteins. Interferon, and interferon inducers may reduce the budding of viruses from an infected cell. The crucial point is that none of these can act against the DNA provirus; all may help contain the infection so long as they are continued. None will rid the body of infection.
HIV infection is currently incurable and likely to remain so. Most of the spread from one individual to another takes place before that individual knows of the problem. Most infected people being unaware of their infection do not seek treatment. Even if they did, most countries can afford neither the treatments available nor the tests to identify those infected. There is, in any case, no treatment offering a permanent cure, and there are compelling reasons to argue that no such treatment will be forthcoming, at least on the time-scale necessary to contain such a rapidly advancing pandemic.
Vaccination
Although infection with HIV gives rise to antibodies, no cure is effected by those antibodies. This is a key difference between HIV infection, and infection with many common viruses. With chickenpox or smallpox, for instance, infection is followed by an immune response, which is in turn associated with recovery and life-long immunity. Accordingly, artificially induced immunity (by vaccination) affords life-long protection. In contrast, the immune response to HIV infection is not followed by recovery. A vaccine against HIV would therefore have to do something which natural infection does not do. The HIV virus exists predominantly within cells, and antibodies are extracellular. Indeed, as with some tumours, antibodies appear to enhance the spread of the HIV virus. Antibodies bind to the virus and lead to its uptake by macrophages. For most other invading organisms, death of the organism is the consequence. Not so for HIV, for the macrophage is precisely the cell in which it is adapted to survive. It appears, therefore, that antibodies can tip the scales in favour of the HIV virus. IS In attacking cells which exhibit viral proteins, the body may well damage many uninfected cells. Infected cells release free gp 120 protein which binds to T 4 receptors on uninfected cells. That bound gp 120, when recognised as foreign, r:nay lead to the destruction of the cell to which it is bound, regardless of whether the cell harboured any virus.
Humoral, or antibody-mediated immunity, is only one aspect of immunity. The other is cell-mediated immunity. Like humoral immunity it depends on the body recognising the virus, or a component of it, as foreign.
Here, several factors operate in favour of the AIDS virus. In budding off from the host cell, the virus coats itself with a layer of that host cell; a layer which the host recognises as 'self, and which cannot be attacked. Only those surface proteins peculiar to the virus can be recognised as foreign. The genes coding for those proteins are mutating, faster than those of most other viruses. Finally, for cellmediated immunity to be produced, the virus must be presented to the T4 lymphocyte by a macrophage. An infected macrophage, however, functions abnormally if at all. These problems underly the pessimism about AIDS vaccines. In the United States, the Surgeon General has warned that no vaccine should be expected at least before the twenty-first century. This is far too late.
Prevention
We can neither vaccinate against, nor cure HIV infection. A remaining option is to change behaviour through public education. To be successful in stopping the epidemic, this must reduce the transmission of the virus to about a sixth of its current value. Although there is evidence that patterns of human behaviour have changed, it is doubtful that the degree of change is adequate. The fall in the rate of new infections in gay communities has been attributed by some workers partly to the fact that in the areas being studied the most promiscuous individuals are now virtually all infected. A recent study from Amsterdam 19 found 39% of cohorts of homosexual men infected with HIV. In a study of homosexual men from 1984 to 1987 20 the incidence of anoreceptive intercourse fell from 90% to 70%. Such behavioural modification is in the right direction, but it is woefully inadequate to stop the epidemic.
Attempts to modify the behaviour of intravenous drug abusers, who are notoriously difficult to influence, can be expected to be even less successful. Even heterosexual couples are unexpectedly difficult to influence. Laurian et al. 21 found that 17 of 31 couples, one of whom was a seropositive haemophiliac, ignored advice to use condoms. Over two years, three of the seventeen partners seroconverted.
Heterosexual spread
Although principally a disease of male homosexuals, spread to the heterosexual community can take place initially via intravenous drug users (IVDUs) or via bisexual males. Most female partners of bisexual males are unaware of their partners' homosexual practices. The key question, whether a self-sustaining epidemic will spread through the heterosexual population, is not yet answerable. The observation that the proportion of HIV infection acquired heterosexually remains low is not, of itself, encouraging: if the small proportion remains constant, it argues only that the doubling time in the heterosexual community is the same as that in IVDUs and the gay community. Rates of HIV transmission between heterosexual partners have been estimated at 10% to 70%. In one long New York study,22 four of twenty heterosexual contacts without any other known risk factor seroconverted. Findings from Europe are similar;23 in 155 heterosexual couples with the male infected, 42 females seroconverted. Identified risk factors were a history of sexually transmitted disease in the female, fully developed AIDS in the male, and anal intercourse. Interestingly, and in agreement with findings in American military couples, the frequency of intercourse did not appear to be a significant indicator of risk. Again, this is in line with findings from artificial insemination; of eight recipients of semen from a single infected semen donor four females seroconverted. 24 In many parts of the world, particularly in some African nations, the epidemic is transmitted principally by heterosexual activities. The underlying message is clear; HIV is transmitted very effectively by 'normal' heterosexual intercourse.
Safety of blood transfusion
Transmission by contaminated blood in not currently a major source of spread in Australia. Containment of this risk is a major achievement of which the appropriate authorities are rightly proud. The increasing use of autologous blood, plasma expanders, and of intraoperative blood scavenging is applauded, although anaesthetists are reminded that autologous blood is often not checked for HIV (or hepatitis B). In many places the law now requires that banked autologous blood be HIV tested. Those who have witnessed the dramatic outcome of a pressurised unit of blood bursting, or becoming disconnected, may be reticent to pressurise a unit of un screened autologous blood.
Two strategies contribute to the safety of stored blood; the screening out of donors known to practise 'risk' behaviour, and the testing of antibodies against HIV. Neither is foolproof; many people have now been infected by transfusion of infected seronegative blood. Voluntary exclusion relies on those at risk knowing their risk status; partners of bisexual males, and an increasing number exposed to heterosexual spread, do not.
Serological screening fails during the seronegative window; roughly 8% of infected blood given a six-week seronegative period and a one-year doubling time for HIV infection. 25 ,26 Models by Salzberg and Dolins 27 suggest that the proportion of carriers who are seronegative might be as high as 20% early in an epidemic, falling to 3% later. If sentinel screening (the screening of a random sample ofthe population) is instigated, we hope that it will show that the doubling time for HIV infection is now longer than a year. If it is not, then 8% of the infected blood now represents more than the total amount of infected blood four years ago; the risk of inadvertently giving infected blood during the seronegative window would now exceed the risk of giving serologically unscreened blood four years ago.
HIV infection in health-care workers
Health care workers, like anyone else, can contract HIV infection through exposure via risk behaviour. Of central concern, however, is the risk of HIV infection through normal working e~posure to HIV infected patients. Current data suggests that the risk of seroconversion after 'adverse exposure' (needlestick injury, mucous membrane exposure) is less than 1 %; four per thousand is the often quoted figure. This is greater than previous estimates, but is still described as 'trivial'. Combined surveillance studies from several centres, reported by Barnes,28 are less encouraging; sixteen seroconversions among 'more than 2200' people injured while working with HIV infected material. It is worth examining in greater detail the full implications of even 'four in a thousand' seroconversions.
Like any other, the HIV epidemic can only advance at the interface between infected and non-infected populations. Operating room staff are at that interface, and their behaviour will determine the extent to which the epidemic advances through that route. Consider the consequences of four seroconverted health workers resulting from a thousand needles tick injuries. Because we do not know the HIV status of most infected patients, the infected staff will not know of their risk and subsequent seroconversion. In the heterosexual population to which we assume the infected staff belong, the basic reproductive rate for the HIV infection is close to unity. 4 We will take the optimistic view that the value is close to, but less than, one, so that each infected heterosexual does not give rise to an infinitely self-sustaining epidemic. In doing this we assume that trainee medical and nursing staff at our central teaching hospitals, most commonly involved in 'adverse exposure' to HIV infected material, are no less sexually active than other heterosexuals contracting HIV infection. We also assume that an HI V-infected person working in theatre and whose behaviour leads to their own seroconversion, is unlikely to subsequently place a patient at risk. Both these assumptions might be questioned, but we will continue to take the optimistic point of view. With a value of R, the basic reproductive rate for HIV in the heterosexual population taken to be 0.9 to 0.95, each member of staff infected will, on average, give rise to a wave of infection which will eventually die out in the heterosexual community; although not giving rise to an indefinitely self-sustaining epidemic, the expected number of people eventually infected as a result of each of the original four will ultimately be ten or twenty. That is, the thousand needlestick injuries are expected ultimately to give rise to forty to eighty HIV infected individuals (Figures 1 and 2) . Reminding ourselves that each of these will have an immediate family (brothers, sisters, spouse, parents, children) intimately affected by their HIV infection, and assuming that each infected individual has on average four such immediate family members, there are two hundred to four hundred people either infected, or with an immediate family member infected, as an ultimate result of the initial thousand needlestick injuries. That is a consequence that can scarcely be dismissed as trivial.
A key assumption likely to come under scrutiny is that of an initial seroconversion rate of only four per thousand needlestick injuries. It has long been assumed that seroconversion following needlestick injury would occur within a few weeks or months, as it does for recipients of a whole unit of infected blood. J ones and Solomon 25 drew attention to the tenuous nature of this assertion; because the provirus can lie dormant in the DNA for an indefinite period, innoculation with a small number of viruses could be followed by seroconversion many years later. Long seronegative periods in infected persons have now been confirmed using a sensitive technique, the polymerase chain reaction, which can detect minute quantities of viral DNA. Reporting on the fourth International AIDS Conference held in Sweden last year, Benditt 29 draws attention to the findings of the Multicentre AIDS Cohort Study in which the interval between infection and antibody production was found to be as long as 42 months. If this is confirmed, it will be necessary to monitor the victims of needles tick injuries for many years to determine the final seroconversion rate, which may be higher than current estimates.
A reasonable assessment of the risk to health workers from adverse exposure to HIV contaminated material depends on four things: the risk of seroconversion after needlestick, the consequences of seroconversion, the proportion of patients who carry HIV, and the frequency of needlestick injury. Consider now the last two of these.
Most data on HIV seropositivity comes from the United States. Blood donors have been widely tested. The United States average for seropositive blood donation was 0.2 per thousand in 1987. 26 Because of voluntary self exclusion from donating and because those once found to be seropositive for HIV will rarely present again for donation, this would be a very low estimate of seropositivity in the population at large. It essentially reflects the rate of seroconversion in a low-risk subset of the population but it will include, however, some who donate blood in order to find out their HIV status. With this risk in mind, alternative sites for anonymous testing have been made available.
Reporting on the findings at these sites between mid-I985 and December 1987, Grabau and Morse 30 quote an average of7.6% positive in a total of 17,724 tests. We can consider this to be a very high estimatenearly four hundred times that found in donated blood. It makes the salutory point that biased estimates are not just biased by a factor of two or three; they can be exceedingly biased. Hoff et al. 31 reporting on the seropositivity of childbearing women in Massachusetts found 2.1 per thousand positive with the highest rate of 8.0 per thousand in the inner city. They quote the cumulative incidence of AIDS in Mass. as 0.25/1000 in males and 0.02/1000 in females which is not very different from the United States national average of 0.29/1 000 males and 0.02/1000 females. The incidence in females is about a tenth that in males. These figures are not very different from the Australian experience of 0.141 1 000 males and 0.005/1000 females for the cumulative incidence as of December 1988. Interestingly, the seropositivity rate in childbearing women in Mass. is approximately one hundred times the cumulative AIDS rate for women in that State. If the same ratio holds approximately in Australia, this gives an estimate of one in every two thousand childbearing Australian women. This probably overestimates the prevalence in Australian females generally, because of the age distribution of HIV infection. The incidence in females in Australia is much less than in males, the ratio being about 1 to 25. Of Australian males between the ages of 20 and 40, about 1 % are now infected with HIV. A sample which is more representative of the population presenting to hospitals may come from emergency room studies. Kellen et al. 32 tested 2302 consecutive adult patients attending the emergency room and requiring blood being drawn. One hundred and nineteen of those were found to be seropositive (5.2%), of which only 27 had known symptomatic HIV infection. In the remaining 92, infection was unrecognised at the time of drawing blood. One hopes that the prevalence of HIV seropositivity will be less elsewhere, at least for the time being, but the important message is that more than three-quarters of HIV infections were unsuspected, even in a situation where HIV infection was known to be common, and staff attuned to the problem.
Recent data on the incidence of pin-prick injury suggest that it might be very much more common than previously suspected. Fell et al. 33 reporting on 681 daytime operations over a four-week period found that defects occurred in one or more gloves in 32% of all operations and 38.9% of incisional operations. Perhaps more significant is the development of hepatitis B in the patients operated on by an obstetrician later found to be a carrier of hepatitis B; ten of forty-two patients having hysterectomy, and ten of fiftyone having caesarean section showed signs of recent or current hepatitis B infection. 34 Clearly the incidence of pin-prick injury, and consequent viral transmission, can be much higher than we might previously have assumed. Fortunately the likelihood of transmitting hepatitis B virus is thOUght to exceed that of transmitting HI V: the former are present in much higher numbers in plasma than are the latter. Nevertheless, transmission between patients in hospital is well documented. In a single hospital in Elista, Russia, twenty-seven young children have been infected as a result of poor infection control within the hospital. Five of the twentyseven mothers are now seropositive for HIV, and it appears that the virus has been passed from the children to the mothers. 35 The Russian experience should remind us all of a duty not to be the instruments for spreading HIV either in the hospital or in the general community. We expect to give professional and compassionate care to all patients, regardless of the nature of their suffering, but must not lose sight of the fact that we are part of a larger community. When operating room personnel become infected, the loss of their life is tragic enough. It may be relatively insignificant, however, when compared with the consequent loss of life in the outside community that only becomes apparent when we see the medical and nursing staff as a link in a longer chain of infection. We may have a right, even a duty, to risk our own lives, but not to take a dozen or so fellow citizens with us to a certain and unpleasant death.
It is salutory to draw the above figures together and calculate a cumulative risk for a trainee contemplating a career in anaesthesia. If we make the very optimistic assumption that the prevalence of HI V infection will level off over the next two to four years, then it would have risen from the present one in 300 to about one in 100 patients, assuming that the prevalence in hospital patients is the same as that in the community. The frequency of pin-prick injury and of blood contamination of skin and mucous membrane will be less than the one in five that occurs in some gynaecological situations. A reasonable figure for an anaesthetist might be one in 100. Pinprick from an HI V-infected patient is likely to be followed by seroconversions about 1 % of the time iflater seroconversions are taken into account. Combining these probabilities we have quite literally a one-in-a-million chance of contracting HIV infection from anyone single patient. Obviously this figure will vary widely between anaesthetists; some are more careful, and less likely to prick themselves. On the other hand some work on orthopaedic lists dominated by 20 to 40 year old male patients in whom the HIV carrier rate probably exceeds 1 % now. Some epidemiologists may wish the seroconversion rate to be quoted as 0.4% or 0.7% instead of 1 %. If we balance out these opposing claims, then the one-in-amillion chance of contracting HIV infection seems to be a realistic estimate. An anaesthetist seeing four patients a day for 250 working days in a year will see a thousand patients. This gives a one-in-a-thousand chance of becoming infected each year, which translates to a one in twenty-five chance during a forty-year working life.
In a room containing more than sixteen trainees, there is a better than even chance that one or more of them will contract HIV infection from a patient, develop AIDS and die of it, perhaps still wondering from whom they caught it and to whom they passed it on.
Many of us change our lifestyle in response to lesser risks. We give up smoking, lose weight, decrease cholesterol intake, drink less alcohol, stay out of the sun and so on to decrease our cumulative risk of developing lunglheart/liverlskin disease. It is reasonable to ask what changes we might initiate in order to decrease the cumulative risk of contributing to the AIDS pandemic.
Some changes can be universal: wearing gloves for the induction and reversal of anaesthesia, and using a three-way tap in the intravenous line for drug administration. Needles without points for drawing up drugs would be a help, but in their absence a teflon intravenous catheter is a satisfactory, if expensive, alternative. Together, these precautions avoid the need to use needles during an anaesthetic.
Other changes cannot be universal. A patient known to carry HIV should not be used to teach a student or trainee how to insert an intravenous catheter, intubate the trachea, insert a chest drain, or carry out spinal, epidural or regional anaesthesia. It would be reckless for a surgical trainee to have a first experience closing the peritoneum or skin, or carrying out any technically difficult surgical procedure on such a patient. For some orthopaedic procedures, particularly the removal and replacement of a hip prosthesis, the widespread contamination with blood and bone represents an unacceptable risk to anyone not obliged from considerations of patient care to be in the theatre. Trainees present merely to observe should be given the opportunity to observe these procedures on safer patients. The use of pressurised irrigation/suction equipment during these procedures can lead to fluid splashing off bone and contaminating personnel a metre or more away. By their very nature, these precautions cannot be universal; we cannot simply stop teaching these procedures. Of necessity therefore, they raise the question of testing patients for HIV infection. Such testing will lessen, but not eliminate the risk. Clinical medicine usually involves minimising rather than eliminating risks, so the fact that some risk remains is not at all unusual. The present tests based on antibodies to HIV will be complemented in due course by another based on HIV antigens, minimising the risk from infected but antibody-negative patients.
If medical and nursing staff ask that patients be tested for HIV, might not patients expect medical and nursing staff to be tested? Certainly infection is more likely to be passed from patient to staff than in the other direction, but the public is more likely to accede to the request if the hospital staff set the example. There is little doubt that lives would be saved if we knew which patients, and which staff, carry HIV. Why, then, do we not test?
Many reasons have been given, and the following is a personal interpretation of the situation. We do not test patients, partly because we assume that they do not want to know the truth, but mainly because we have no faith in our ability to maintain confidentiality. The medical problems of HI V infection will be compounded by the medicolegal problem of patients seeking compensation for alleged breach of confidentiality. Life will be much easier for medical administrators, therefore, if we are largely ignorant of our patients' HIV status.
Medical staff do not want to be tested because they are uncertain of their employment prospects if found to carry the virus. Medical administrators do not want their staff tested because they are unsure how they should cope with HIV infected theatre personnel.
Quite literally, ignorance is bliss. We have two options: either we test for HI V, face up to the moral and administrative problems, and save a few more lives, or we fail to test, maintain our ignorance, and kill a few more people, -perhaps including ourselves.
The irony of it is all summed up in a recent AIDS educational slogan:
'AIDS: Don't Die of Ignorance'
